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the failure to file them with the notice of motion is not a 
jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review. (Im-
perial Beverage Co. v. Su.pe1·ior Co1(rt, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150 
P.2d 881].) 
The order vacating the decree is affirmed. 
Gibson, C .. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred m the judgment. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 3, 
1952. 
[L. A. No. 22103. In Bank. Mar. 18, 1952.] 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS-
SION, LEO V. NOWAK et al., Respondents. 
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-A lien for 
unemployment disability payments made to an applicant for 
workmen's compensation must be allowed against a lump sum 
payable under a compromise agreement between him and the 
compensation insurance carrier, since such compromise pay-
ment comes within the definitions of "compensation" as enun-
ciated in Lab. Code, §§ 3207, 5001. 
[2] Id.-Liens on Award.-In determining whether lien for unem-
ployment disability payments should be made against amount 
awarded applicant for workmen's compensation as result of a 
compromise, the "\Vorkmen's Compensation Law and Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act should not be construed together in a 
manner which would defeat the legislative intent to avoid 
overlapping or duplicating payments, and which also would 
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the 
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act where there is a question whether benefits are pay-
able under the compensation law. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission denying· claim of lien against amount payable 
as compensation under a compromise. Order annulled. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 197. 
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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Sherman Welpton, Jr., Herlihy 
& Herlihy and M. A. Cornell, Jr., for Petitioner. 
Sidney L. Weinstock as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Peti-
tioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger and Thomas L. 
Higbee for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Aetna Life Insurance Company seeks re-
view of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission which 
denies Aetna's claim of lien against $2,400 payable to Leo 
V. Nowak, an employe of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Cor-
poration, under a compromise agreement between the employe 
and American Motorists Insurance Company, the workmen's 
compensation insurance carrier of Vultee. 
Petitioner contends, in effect, that the Industrial Accident 
Commission has failed in this case to give effect to t~e legis-
lative intention, declared in the Workmen's Compensation 
Act (Lab. Code, § 4903, par. (f)) and the Unemployment 
Insurance Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, § 207) 
and emphasized by this court in Bryant v. Industrial Ace. 
Com. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32], that a disabled 
workman is not entitled to unemployment compensation dis-
ability benefits for a period of unemployment caused by a 
disability for which he is entitled to workmen's compensation. 
The record sustains this contention and the order of the 
commission must be annulled. 
It was held in the Bryant case that, to make the declared 
intent effective, the Industrial Accident Commission, pursuant 
to paragraph (f) of section 4903 of the Labor Code, must 
allow a lien "against any amount to be paid as [workmen's] 
compensation'' for the ''amount of unemployment compensa-
tion disability benefits which have been paid under or pur-
suant to the Unemployment Insurance Act in those cases 
where, pending a determination under [the workmen's com-
pensation law] . . ., there was uncertainty whether such 
benefits were payable under that act or payable [under the 
workmen's compensation law].'' 
[la] In the present case the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion contends that the lien cannot or should not attach to 
the amount payable under the compromise because that sum 
is not an "amount to be paid as [workmen's] compensation." 
This contention is untenable. The compromise payment comes 
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within the definitions of ''compensation'' as enunciated in 
sections 3207 and 5001 of the Labor Code. (See footnotes 
2 and 3, infra, p. 604.) To sustain the contention would not 
only derog·ate the statute but would permit the Industrial 
Accident Commission to adopt and effectuate a policy sharply 
contrary to that which has been clearly declared by the 
Legislature and which has been expressly upheld by this 
court. (Bryant v. lnd7drial Ace. Com. (1951), supra, 37 Cal. 
2d 215.) 
The history of this proceeding is as follows: Nowak, the 
employe, was unable to work for several months because of 
a disabled back. He claimed that his disability was the result 
of an industrial injury and filed his application for adjust-
ment of claim with the Industrial Accident Commission. 
American Motorists Insurance Company, the workmen's com-
pensation insurance carrier, denied liability. 
Aetna, during the period in question, was the insurer of 
Vultee, the employer, under a voluntary plan for the pay-
ment of unemployment compensation disability benefits and 
other benefits, including medical expenses, where an employe 
became unable to work because of a nonindustrial injury. 
This plan was adopted pursuant to the Unemployment In-
surance Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, art. 10, pt. 
6). Aetna paid $1,256.05 unemployment disability benefits, 
other benefits which were used for living expenses, and medi-
cal expenses. It filed its claim of lien for the amount of 
these payments with the Industrial Accident Commission 
in the proceeding brought by Nowak against American Motor-
ists Insurance Company. On this claim Nowak endorsed 
the following: ''I consent to the requested allowance of a lien 
against my compensation.'' 
Nowak and American Motorists negotiated a compromise 
of their controversy as to whether Nowak was entitled to 
workmen's compensation. Their agreement recites, as the 
reason for compromise, that ''grave dispute exists as to whether 
there was an injury arising out of and in course of the em-
ployment, and if so, whether said injury resulted in the 
condition of which applicant complains. There is also dis-
pute as to whether there is resultant permanent disability. 
The parties seek to avoid the hazards of further litigation." 
They ''agree to settle any and all claims on account of said 
injury by the payment of . . . $2,400.00 . . . in one lump 
sum, less attorney's fees as set by the Commission." The 
compromise agreement does not mention Aetna's claim of lien. 
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Shortly after the compromise was presented to the In-
dustrial .Accident Commission for approval, the employe's 
attorney wrote to the Industrial Accident Commission stating 
that the employe and the workmen's compensation insurance 
carrier ''contemplated that the lien of Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
would not be observed. For that reason, the reason for the 
Compromise and Release was specifically framed so that it 
went only to resolvement of the issue of injury and to the 
issue of permanent disability"; that "Aetna has merely paid 
what is its true share considering the fact that applicant's 
condition may have been wholly or partially non-industrial." 
A copy of this letter was sent to Aetna. Aetna then wrote 
to the Industrial Accident Commission stating, "We believe 
that the only reason for the proposed compromise is an effort 
on the part of the applicant to retain the $1,200 admittedly 
paid to him by the Aetna Life Insurance Company and an 
effort on the defendant's part to help him retain it, thereby 
saving them the payment of an equal amount in order to 
effect compromise. The issue of the Aetna Life Insurance 
Company's lien is before the commission and we do not be-
lieve the applicant and the defendant have a legal right to in 
effect destroy our statutory lien by agreement simply by stat-
ing that the compromise does not intend to dispose of certain 
issues.'' Aetna's letter requested a further hearing. Such 
hearing was had. Aetna established that it had paid $1,256.05 
in medical expenses and weekly payments which the employe 
used for living expenses and that its policy did not cover 
industrial injuries. 
At that hearing (and in its petition for rehearing) Aetna 
directed the referee's attention to the opinion of the District 
Court of Appeal in Bryant v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1950), 
reported at (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 444. This is the Bryant 
case in which we granted a hearing and the final opinion in 
which is reported at 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32]. While the 
Bryant case was pending in this court the Industrial .Accident 
Commission made the order here attacked; it approved the 
compromise and ordered that Aetna's claimed lien be denied 
and that Aetna be dismissed from the proceeding. 
The Industrial .Accident Commission takes the position 
that an essential basis for application of paragraph (f) of 
section 4903 of the Labor Code and the principles enunciated 
in the Bryant case is the determination by that commission 
that the disabling injury was sustained in circumstances which 
entitle the disabled employe to workmen's compensation dur-
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ing a period for which he has received unemployment com-
pensation disability benefits, and that, for the benefit of the 
injured workman, it can leave open the question whether his 
injury was industrial, and that a person in the position of 
Aetna, who has advanced disability payments prior to de-
termination of the issue, has no right to have the issue de-
termined. The commission says that under general Industrial 
Accident Commission policy and specific rule1 it would not 
leave open the question of the industrial character of the 
injury and would not approve a compromise such as the one 
here unless there was doubt that the workman could establish 
that he was entitled to workmen's compensation. In support 
of this argument the Industrial Accident Commission refers 
to evidence, received at an intermediate hearing before it, 
which tends to show that the workman's disability had no 
connection with his employment. If the question had been 
litigated, it says, the workman might well have been awarded 
nothing and Aetna would then have received nothing because 
there would have been neither a right to reimbursement nor a 
fund upon which to claim a lien. However, in that event, the 
issue in which Aetna is interested would have been both heard 
and determined. 
Aetna urges that the Industrial Accident Commission should 
be required to decide whether the injury was industrial, be-
cause the procedure adopted here-refusal to determine the 
issue and dismissal of Aetna-is tantamount to refusal to 
hear and could result in the perpetration of a fraud on it as 
a result of collusion between the employe and the workmen's 
compensation insurance carrier, the perpetration of which 
would be aided by such procedure of the Industrial Accident 
Commission. Furthermore, Aetna asserts, if the procedure 
here followed by the commission is upheld, carriers such as 
Aetna inevitably will refuse to pay claimed unemployment 
compensation disability benefits promptly and, necessarily 
for the proper handling of their business under those circum-
stances, will await final decision by the Industrial Accident 
Commission as to whether the injury is industrial. There is 
merit in both contentions. Without even considering the 
18ection 10890, title 8, of the California Administrative Code reads, 
''Agreements which provide for the payment of less than the full amount 
of compensation due or to become due, and which undertake to release 
the employer from all future liability, will be approved only where it 
appears that a reasonable doubt exists as to the rights of the parties 
or that approval would be for the best interest of the parties.'' 
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basic legal implications of the first, the latter contention is 
impelling. 
[2] Obviously it is to the benefit of disabled workmen and 
in full accord with the salutary public policy of the relevant 
statutes that such workmen receive prompt payment pending 
determination of the cause of their disability. The Work-
men's Compensation Law and the Unemployment Insurance 
Act should not "be construed together in a manner which not 
only would defeat directly one legislative intent (to avoid 
overlapping or duplicating payments) but which also would 
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the 
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment In-
surance Act where there is a question whether benefits are 
payable under the compensation law. To the contrary see 
section 3202 of the Labor Code : The provisions of the Work-
men 's Compensation Law "shall be liberally construed by 
the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for 
the protection of persons injured in the course of their em-
ployment.'' And, as this court pointed out in California Emp. 
Com. v. Los Angeles Etc. News Corp. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 421, 
427 [150 P.2d 186], the Unemployment Insurance Act "is a 
remedial statute and as such must be liberally construed for 
the purpose of accomplishing its objects." 
[lb] As stated above, there is no merit to the contention 
of the Industrial Accident Commission that the amount to 
be pa.id under the compromise agreement is not "compensa-
tion." The payment clearly comes within the general defini-
tion of "compensation" in the Workmen's Compensation Law2 
and the definition thereof in the chapter of that law which 
concerns compromise and release.3 
Both parties have cited Hawthorn v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1951), 101 Cal.App.2d 568, 572 [225 P.2d 966]. That case, 
however, is not determinative of the issue in the present case. 
Hawthorn, a city fireman and a member of the State Em-
ployees' Retirement System, was injured in line of duty. 
Under special provisions of the Labor Code which apply to 
"Section 3207 of the Labor Code provides, " 'Compensation' means 
compensation under Division IV [the Workmen's Compensation Law] 
and includes every benefit or payment conferred by Division IV upon an 
injured employee, or in the event of his death, upon his dependents, 
without regard to negligence.'' 
"Section 5001 of the Labor Code provides, ''Compensation is the 
measure of the responsibility which the employer has assumed for in-
juries or deaths which occur to employees in his employment when sub-
ject to this division. No release of liability or compromise agreement 
is valid unless it is approved by the commission.'' 
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firemen so injured (div. IV, pt. 2, ch. 2, art. 7) Hawthorn 
was entitled to leave of absence without loss of salary in lieu 
of temporary disability workmen's compensation (Lab. Code, 
§ 4850), and the Industrial Accident Commission was re-
quired, at the request of the city or the retirement system, 
to determine whether the disability was incurred in line of 
duty (Lab. Code, § 4851). The only holding of the Hawthorn 
case is that the commission had neither duty nor power to 
award leave of absence and salary. Its closest approach to 
relevancy here lies in the suggestion that the commission's 
"only responsibility is to determine upon request whether 
the djsability claimed arose out of and in the course of the 
employment." In that case, however, the city and the re-
tirement system, which could require the commission to de-
termine whether the :fireman's disability arose out of and in 
the course of employment, were not parties in interest claiming 
a lien as is Aetna, the one who is entitled to require the 
commission to make a similar determination as to the employe 
here. 
'\Ve conclude that if the parties, including Aetna, cannot 
work out an agreement which effects a settlement of Aetna's 
claim, then the Industrial Accident Commission should de-
termine the period of disability for which the employe is 
entitled to compensation and allow the claimed lien for the 
amounts of unemployment disability benefits paid during that 
period. 
For the reasons above stated, the order is annulled and 
the cause is remanded to the Industrial Accident Commission 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
Gibson, C .. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CAR'rER, .T.-I dissent. 
I reaffirm the views expressed in my dissent in Bryant v. 
Industria[ Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215, 223 [231 P.2d 32]. 
There are features about this case, however, which necessi-
tate additional discussion. 
The majority holds that a lien for unemployment disability 
payments made to an applicant for workmen's compensation 
must be allowed against a lump sum award made as the re-
sult of a compromise. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, 
as amended, § 207) provides that a person shall be entitled to 
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disability payments thereunder unless he has received or is 
entdled to receive compensation under the workmen's com-
pensation laws. In the instant case there has never been a 
showing that Nowak, the employe, was entitled to compensa-
tion. He received a lump sum by way of a compromise agree-
ment between him and his employer's insurance carrier. To 
reach the result that such sum is compensation, and thus 
subject to a lien for disability payments, the majority reasons 
that if the lien is not allowed, the insurer covering the liability 
for disability payments will not make them promptly but 
will withhold them to see if workmen's compensation is 
awarded, and, therefore, the liberal application of the work-
men's compensation laws would thus be thwarted. There can 
be no doubt that petitioner was required by law to make the 
disability payments whether or not an award of workmen's 
compensation was made in the applicant's favor. It is strange 
reasoning indeed which supposes a ''probable'' failure to 
comply with the law as a reason for interpreting a statute 
favorable to the prospective law violator. The presumption 
is to the contrary. A person is presumed to be innocent of 
wrong and that the law has been and will be obeyed. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1963 [ 1, 33].) Hence, we will not suppose that the 
requirement that disability payments be made will be wilfully 
disobeyed. 
This is the first case which has come to my attention in 
which the author of the majority opinion has relied upon 
section 3202 of the Labor Code as a basis for the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of that code or the workmen's com-
pensation law, and then such reliance is for the purpose of 
denying the benefits of the law to persons injured in the 
course of their employment. This is indeed using the mandate 
of liberal construction for its own destruction. A definition 
of liberal construction may be found in my dissenting opinion 
in Caliform·a Shipb1tilding Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 31 
Cal.2d 270, 288, 289 [188 P.2d 27]. 
There is another factor of compelling importance. The 
effect of the majority's interpretation is that there must be a 
determination of whether compensation is payable in every 
case, and, therefore, the provision for compromising com-
pensation claims becomes ineffective, and might just as well 
be stricken from the statute. There can be no compromise, 
because, if it must be decided whether the injury is com-
pensable in all cases, and hence a lien attaches, there is nothing 
to compromise. The statute says that nothing therein (and 
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that includes the allowance of a lien for disability payments) 
shall prevent a compromise. It reads: "No contract, rule, 
or regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for 
the compensation fixed by this division, but nothing in this 
division shall: (a) ... Impair the right of the parties in-
terested to compromise, subject to the provisions herein con-
tained, any liability which is claimed to exist under this di-
vision on account of injury or death." (Italics added.) (Lab. 
Code, § 5000.) "Compensation is the measure of the re-
sponsibility which the employer has assumed for injuries or 
deaths which occur to employees in his employment when 
subject to this division. No release of liability or compromise 
agreement is valid unless it provides for the payment of full 
compensation in accordance with this division or unless ap-
proved by the commission." (Lab. Code, § 5001.) If when 
a lien is filed against a compromise award the commission 
must decide whether the injury is compensable, the extent 
of the disability and the amount of compensation, the com-
promise is nullified because it is based on a dispute as to 
those factors. It is clear, therefore, that the right to compro-
mise is not only impaired in direct violation by section 5000, 
it is completely destroyed. 
Even conceding the soundness of the majority holding in 
the Bryant case, which I do not, it should not be extended 
to a case such as this where the only award made in favor of 
the injured employee is by way of a compromise on the issue 
of liability. This should be apparent when we consider the 
desirability from the standpoint of the injured employee of 
compromising cases of doubtful liability. Such cases, if not 
compromised, are generally taken into court which results 
in delay and expense to both parties, and often the defeat of 
applicant's claim. The Legislature, therefore, wisely pro-
vided for a compromise, believing it to be to the best interests 
of the applicant in doubtful cases of liability. In fact a 
compromise is often reached where the agreement expressly 
provides that it does not constitute an admission of liability 
by the defendant-employer. Generally, in such cases the ap-
plicant agrees to accept much less than the amount of his 
claim. Such being the case it is apparent that if a lien is 
permitted for unemployment disability payments against the 
amount agreed upon by way of compromise, the incentive 
to compromise will be greatly minimized and many injured 
employees will be deprived of the benefits of this remedial 
statute enacted for their protection. If, as the majority says, 
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the Unemployment Insurance .Act and the Workmen's Com-
pensation .Act should be construed together as remedial 
statutes, and as such, must be liberally construed for the 
purpose of accomplishing their objects, it seems clear that 
such a construction of the two acts would lead to a holding 
that the lien provision of the former act would not apply to 
an award based upon a compromise of liability for the injury 
for which disability payments were made. Considerations of 
public policy should dictate that it is of far greater importance, 
particularly in advaneing the social and economic welfare of 
injured workingmen, to compromise and settle disputed claims 
for workmen's compensation, than to permit a few carriers of 
unemployment disability insurance to recoup their unem-
ployment disability payments from the amount of an award 
based upon a compromise and thus destroy the incentive to 
compromise such claimfl. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that even if the majority's 
interpretation is correct, the claimant of the lien for disa-
bility payments had the burden of establishing the validity 
of its lien which necessarily required it to establish that 
Nowak's injury was compensable, the extent of the disability 
and the amount of compensation payable. That is true be-
cause it is not entitled to the lien unless the award was payable 
under the workmen's compensation laws. It has failed to 
meet this burden, as it offered no evidence on the subject. 
I would, therefore, affirm the order of the commission deny-
ing petitioner's lien. 
Respondent's (I..A.C.) petition for a rehearing was denied 
.April 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the peti-
tion should be granted. 
